From Prague to Europe - Russian Disinformation and Hybrid Interference

Introduction
The Czech Republic, as both a NATO and EU member, plays an important role in European regional security while facing rising societal polarization and declining trust in institutions. This makes its information space highly vulnerable to external manipulation and interference. This situation has been actively exploited by Russia through coordinated disinformation and hybrid campaigns.

For the purpose of this article, hybrid influence refers to a blend of disinformation and both psychological and media manipulation designed to shape and reinforce perceptions without open confrontation. The focus of this article lies on Russian-linked activities in Czechia around the 2025 parliamentary elections, examined within the broader European pattern of kinetic and informational influence. Drawing mainly on investigations conducted by Voxpot, the goal is to show how these campaigns operate and what they mean for democratic trust, as well as current stability and security in both the Czech Republic and Europe.

Such operations aim to threaten more than a single election — they corrode public confidence, weaken institutions, and test the resilience of Czech democracy as part of a wider struggle over Europe’s information space.

Elections as a Hybrid Battlefield
Elections present a major opportunity for malicious hybrid operations. They attract intense public attention, stir emotions, and strain the institutions responsible for maintaining transparency and trust — all while information circulates faster than usual. For actors like Russia, such moments represent a strategic window of opportunity to amplify social divides and undermine confidence in democracy.

Crucially, the objective of Russian information influence is not necessarily to promote a specific political party or candidate. Instead, it seeks to delegitimise the government, military, and state officials, the electoral process itself, and trust in public institutions — prompting citizens to question whether democracy still functions and whether the country’s Western orientation remains legitimate.

In this context, the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic serve as a clear example of this trend. In the online space, narratives and topics have emerged, often framed in populist or conspiratorial tones. These include claims that Czechia is being dragged into the war between Russia and Ukraine (implying that support for Ukraine threatens national security and sovereignty); that Ukraine has already lost the war (undermining support for Ukraine); and that sanctions against Russia are damaging the Czech economy. Specific examples include statements such as Ukraine’s economy is about to collapse, NATO may trigger nuclear war, or allegations of drug use among Western leaders.

These narratives build on existing divisions and discontent within Czech society. They exploit pre-existing conditions such as economic frustration following inflation and the energy crisis, distrust in political elites after COVID-19, and overall public war fatigue. In other words, they use ongoing social, economic, and political issues as emotional leverage.

Data analysis of the 16 largest disinformation websites conducted by Voxpot shows that the current production of disinformation content has reached an all-time high — around 120 articles per day — comparable to major mainstream Czech media outlets. The share (approximately 10% of daily output) of content directly referencing or derived from Russian state propaganda (including platforms like Sputnik, RT, and intelligence-linked channels) continues to grow. Voxpot’s analysis also indicates that the frequency of content production correlates with rising Russian assertiveness. Many of these websites are financed directly from Russia or by entities with Russian ties.

Research by the Centre for Online Risk Research shows that TikTok has become an effective tool for spreading pro-Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic, partly driven by artificially generated engagement. The study identified more than 200 unique accounts that regularly publish or share pro-Russian narratives and express support for anti-system political parties such as Stačilo!, SPD, or PRO. These accounts are interconnected — they follow and repost each other, amplifying their collective reach. Their cumulative weekly view count ranges between five and nine million views, exceeding the combined reach of the official TikTok accounts of leading Czech political figures.

The content often glorifies Vladimir Putin, spreads disinformation justifying Russian aggression against Ukraine, and appears in Czech, Slovak, or Russian, sometimes accompanied by Russian music. The Centre’s continuous six-week monitoring of TikTok’s public “For You” feed revealed that these activities are consistent and systematically organised, posing a long-term challenge for Czech information security.

The European Context – Doppelgänger Campaign

This phenomenon is not unique to the Czech Republic — it fits into a broader pattern of Russia-linked influence operations across the world. One of the best-documented examples is the so-called Operation Doppelgänger. This wide-ranging information campaign impersonates and clones reputable media outlets and public institutions, creating independent-looking media networks and niche websites across the political West with the aim of spreading pro-Russian narratives, promoting anti-Ukrainian sentiment, undermining trust in institutions, and deepening societal divisions.

The Doppelgänger operation disseminates pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian content through fake social media accounts and paid ads. One of its most visible tactics, known as the “German Odettes,” involved fake Facebook profiles claiming to work for Netflix, which posted comments under reputable media pages to engage ordinary users. The campaign also employed fake accounts on X, monitored engagement across Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok, and amplified posts using disposable ad accounts. To conceal its origins, operators used geofencing and URL redirections. Analysts note that these tactics mirror those of cryptocurrency scammers and warn that Doppelgänger could expand through spoofed domains, mirrored media sites, or programmatic advertising on other platforms, making disinformation even harder to detect.

Objectives, Tools, and Tactics

Russian hybrid operations do not rely on a single channel. Instead, they combine multiple layers — including the media layer (“fake news”), the social layer (memes and social media content), and the organisational layer (NGOs or social movements). Together, these create an ecosystem designed to polarize society and erode public trust.

Beyond online efforts, hybrid operations may also include kinetic acts — that is, physical activities beyond cyberspace — such as graffiti campaigns, arson attempts, assassination plots, infrastructure sabotage, or bomb threats targeting schools, shopping centres, and other public spaces. In many cases, these acts involve, knowingly or unknowingly, criminal entities — both “single-use” actors and pre-existing affiliated criminal networks. This strategy may draw on lessons from Russia’s partners, such as Iran and North Korea, both experienced in outsourcing hybrid operations to criminal proxies.

Such events, observed across Europe, serve primarily psychological purposes rather than causing real physical damage. Their goal is to amplify fear and chaos in public discourse and influence decision-making processes. Kinetic attacks also create psychological pressure on targeted societies. According to GLOBSEC’s publication Russia’s Crime–Terror Nexus, “Populations are increasingly conditioned to ‘blame it all on Russians’ with any industrial accident. While such perceptions are often inaccurate, they place additional strain on national security systems and heighten demands for visible action.”

Implications The ultimate aim of Russian campaigns is not to secure short-term political gains but to gradually erode trust in democratic institutions, media, and public discourse. They spread conspiratorial narratives, delegitimise institutions, and foster cynicism among citizens. The societal consequences include political apathy, the normalization of conspiracy thinking, and the fragmentation of public debate — often exploiting existing frustrations such as economic hardship, political dissatisfaction, or war fatigue. Czech security agencies like BIS have noted that hybrid threats have become a permanent threat of the national security landscape.

Current responses to Russian hybrid influence — such as fact-checking, media literacy initiatives, and sanctions — remain largely reactive. What is needed instead is systemic resilience, including improved public narrative literacy, stronger cross-sector cooperation between government, media, and civil society, enhanced platform regulation, and strategic communication measures.

In the Czech Republic, insufficient political will and bureaucratic complexity hinder the enforcement of sanctions against Russian-affiliated entities. Regarding the information space, some political figures perceive pro-Russian networks as marginal due to the long-standing presence of a pro-Russian segment of the population. Meanwhile, uneven implementation of sanctions and border controls across the EU creates security gaps that facilitate the spread of hybrid threats.

Conclusion

Russian hybrid influence campaigns represent a long-term challenge aimed at eroding confidence in democratic institutions rather than achieving short-term political objectives. The Czech case demonstrates how disinformation ecosystems exploit existing divisions, economic grievances, and social fatigue to fragment public debate and delegitimise state authority. Building resilience requires not only countering individual narratives but also reinforcing institutional integrity, media independence, and public awareness — supported by coordinated European efforts that address hybrid threats as a shared security concern.

AI Disclaimer

Artificial intelligence tools were used in the preparation of this article for the purposes of summarising selected source materials, refining language and style, and translating certain sections.

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